Food calamities and governance; an inventory of approaches by Burger, C.P.J.
Platform Agriculture, Innovation & Society
Food calamities and 
governance
an inventory of approaches
CLM -A3 (5)omslagen2010.indd   2 23-12-2010   10:43:41
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food calamities and governance -  
an inventory of approaches 
 
 
 
Kees Burger  
DEC  
Wageningen University 
2 April 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development Economics, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN  
Wageningen, The Netherlands. Contact kees.burger@wur.nl, tel. +31-317-484668 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report was initiated and financed by the Platform 
Agriculture, Innovation & Society from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation 
(www.platformlis.nl). 
 3 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
1. Introduction        4 
 
2. The regulation of present system     5 
 
3. Governance and disaster management    7 
 
4. The role of the government      9 
 
5. The role of the private sector     11 
 
6. The role of research       13 
 
7. Current nationa arrangement concerning food provision 14 
 
8. Initiatives by the European Union    16 
 
9. International arrangements     17 
 
10. Conclusions and recommendations    18 
 
 
References         20 
 
 
Appendix: Terms of Reference     23 
 4 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of governance refers to the arrangements made for the exchange of 
goods and services. They can be between two parties but also involve the whole set of 
links in a supply chain. They can relate to contracts but also to mutual understandings, 
quality definitions and agreed procedures upon which contracts are based. While these 
arrangements can be between private parties, the government is typically involved in 
providing the institutional setting in which the arrangements are made and can be 
legally enforced. 
 
Governance guides the trade in food products along the supply chains, from input 
provision to the farmers, from farmer to processor and consumer. Numerous deals are 
made every day, institutions such as futures markets and auctions, guide the pricing of 
products, elaborate arrangements as to sharing of risks are well developed in the 
intensive livestock sector and elsewhere. The arrangements that have evolved over 
time, are, in general, typically bottom-up institutions that emerged because they serve 
the purpose of reducing transaction costs. The institutions help to facilitate the trade in 
inputs and outputs, and thereby reduce the costs of doing business, to the shared 
benefit of producers and consumers.  
Such arrangements are least needed when products are homogeneous, and individuals 
involved behave predictably. The more products can differ, and the more the actors 
involved differ, and the more this occurs in unpredictable ways, the stronger is the 
need for arrangements, for protocols to cling to when striking a deal. Arrangements 
must be in place for not adhering to quality standards, delivery times etc. 
Punishments, legally enforceable or coming from a threat of discontinuing 
partnership, form part and parcel of arrangements in trade. 
While governance is therefore intrinsically geared to dealing with deviations from the 
standard modus operandi, it is, at the same time, limited to the normal deviations. 
Repercussions of exceptional events are mostly left open and acted upon in an ad hoc 
manner, rather than by the book. In such events, trust and mutual understanding 
between partners is more important, and indeed put to the test. 
 
In normal circumstances therefore, a governance structure of the food system has 
evolved that serves the system so as to reduce transaction costs. While its overarching 
conditions are often set by the government policy as to the sector, the private sector, 
with the help of an enabling government, has developed arrangements to its own 
liking. 
 
The question addressed in this review is whether this governance structure of the food 
system is robust enough to cover extreme events, calamities, that strike unexpectedly 
and may harm large sections of the system. Do normal arrangements cover part of 
what should be done in these circumstances, or do they perhaps hinder the application 
of adequate governance fit for such extreme events? 
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2. The regulation of present system  
 
The present regulatory system of food production and food provision is a result of 
changes that developed over time. In a recent paper Lee and Marsden (2009) 
distinguish four phases in recent history. The first phase they associate with 
government taking the lead in controlling food and safety standards with ample 
powers for punishment; in the second phase (estimated to be in the early nineties for 
the UK),  most of the quality control is relegated to the private sector, in particular the 
large-scale companies; in the third phase the government reappears at the scene, but 
then at a higher (here European) level, where the Food Safety Agency ‘seeks to assert 
its authority on the basis of risk-management structures’(p.133). In this phase, 
institutions are set up to monitor risks, but in such a way as to facilitate free trade and 
enable the establishment of private sector standards. The fourth phase they see starting 
about now, with more emphasis on food security and indeed the resilience of the food 
system. The latter issues emerge, they say, as a result of increased concentration of the 
food industry and are therefore based on the same anxiety among the public as the 
stronger demand for food safety that characterized the third phase. 
The interpretation of past events by Lee and Marsden (2009) seems to reflect a 
growing distrust among the wider public vis-à-vis the large scale enterprises in the 
food system. After initially bestowing these companies with responsibilities, these 
were tentatively taken back by the governments after the BSE and dioxin crises and 
new arrangements must now be made to re-establish the shared responsibility between 
the state and the private sector.   
 
The occurrence of crises and food scares, and the stronger demand for quality aspects 
of food has, somewhat ironically, provided a further incentive for firms in the food  
chain to intensify their collaboration and indeed to merge into larger vertically 
integrated units. This enables the companies to take full control of quality assurance 
(Kenneth et al., 1998). As Fritz and Schiefer (2008) argue however, such integration 
may not go along well with innovation and the flexibility to achieve this. For such 
innovative process, looser ties are helpful, but loose ties are feasible only, if sufficient 
transparency of the processes of the firms is guaranteed.  
Another disadvantage of the larger size of the companies is that their sheer weight in 
the food system makes them ‘unavoidable’ for any regulation that the government 
may wish to impose. That is, the regulation should be consistent with their way of 
operating, or it would fail to provide the sought-after guarantee to the public. The very 
large companies have acquired the status of ‘system companies’ (using a word from 
the current banking crisis) whose continued operation is a necessary condition for the 
system to function. If these companies would fall, substantial harm is done before the 
system can re-establish itself on a new track. 
 
Resilience of the food system is enhanced (Pingali et al., 2005) by strengthening 
diversity, local institutions and traditional support networks, the use of local 
knowledge and the individual ability to adapt and reorganize. The presence of ‘system 
companies’ in the food system, unless they internalize such requirements, may not be 
consistent with these demands for a healthy food system.  
 
Taking this point a bit further, a healthy food system should not just guard against 
‘system companies’ but also against occurrence of the same ingredient in too many 
products or the same port or other ‘points of constriction’ being used for too large a 
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share of flows in the food system. The degree of sophistication of the food industries 
and its globalization has reached a level in which small quantities of many ingredients 
appear in lots of processed food around the world. Some ingredients, such as glycerin, 
milk powder or stabilizers, may come from a single source (country) and, as the case 
of melamine in China showed, impurities overlooked in one country may affect a very 
large number of food products. Some ports are of exceptional importance for food 
system, or for parts of it. Rotterdam and Antwerp ports of course play a crucial role 
for western Europe, and as shown in the British report on its food system some ports 
take on a strategically important role for specific types of food (DEFRA, 2006).  
 
Good governance of the food system recognizing the strategic role of such companies, 
infrastructure and limits to the spread of ingredients, would require the authorities to 
sit around the table with the companies concerned as regulation must be consistent 
with the practice. While port authorities will be mostly public, many private firms 
have also reached strategic importance and some public-private arrangement must be 
worked out to reach sufficient compliance. 
 
Resilience can be seen as an alternative to disaster preparedness (Pingali et al., 2005). 
The more resilient a system is, the less should one fear disasters. As set out above, 
however, the system may not be able to withstand calamities, however resilient it was 
judged to be in normal conditions.  
 
To sustain future events without great harm, the government and stakeholders face 
two types of task: assure the resilience of the system under more or less normal 
conditions, and prepare for calamities that go beyond the coping capacities of the 
system. The less the system can cope with, the more disaster preparation must be 
made. 
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3. Governance and disaster management 
 
According to International Risk Governance Council (IRGC, 2008) five linked phases 
in the risk governance framework are distinguished:  
1. pre-assessment, which refers to the framing of the risk: is it new, can it be 
compared to existing risks? Who are the stakeholders? 
2. appraisal: develops and synthesizes the knowledge base relevant for the risk, 
its characteristics, probability, stakeholder concerns 
3. characterization and evaluation: provide the evidence and values upon 
which a judgment is based as to the severity of the risk, and the need for 
measures 
4. management involves the design and implementation of the actions, allocates 
and verifies responsibilities and assesses repercussions of the actions 
5. communication is of utmost importance as this is crucial for the creation of 
trust in risk management. 
 
These phases in the process of risk governance can be considered at firm level, sector 
level or higher levels. It is a list of steps in preparation for the eventuality of a disaster 
of some form which, in this context, has to be specified. Yet, the approach differs 
according to the risk involved. 
 
 
 
This figure, taken from IRGC (2008, p18) indicates how the approach differs for 
different types of risk. Simple risks have simple approaches, uncertain and ambiguous 
risks require much more stakeholder involvement and encompassing decision 
procedures. 
 
Applying this to the food system, there are clear similarities. For many decades the 
food sector had institutional arrangements for the assessment of health risks, using 
approaches in the ‘simple’ and the ‘complex’ columns. To deal with risks that are not 
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as objectively assessable, community based, political approaches are followed. 
Examples include the ‘political’ decision making on trade restrictions in the case of 
BSE in the UK, and the EU stance on GMOs. Risks that depend on stakeholders’ 
attitudes and actions, as is the case with large-scale industries, cannot be dealt with 
without them and must involve these companies and/or their representative 
organizations. Credibility of any arrangements with the wider public may necessitate 
their involvement as well. 
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4. The role of the government  
 
The government has an enabling role in providing the institutional setting for 
whatever arrangements are made between stakeholders. This may be the regulatory 
framework, within which companies can assure their customers – and bind themselves 
legally – that they will adhere to the agreed standards and procedures.  
 
The government has an additional role in solving what is called coordination failures. 
In this role, the government brings parties together that otherwise would not have 
sufficient incentive to do so. In the case of (food) risks, the development of joint 
standards and procedures by the industry is an example of collective action that may 
require a government as a catalyst or coordinator. Standards and safety measures 
along the supply chains also require coordination, that may or may not be adequately 
dealt with by the stakeholders themselves. 
 
The government has a role in providing public goods (Paarlberg, 2002), such as 
security, that requires the government to force companies to adopt procedures and 
apply standards. In this case, it is the government itself that sets the standards (though 
this is likely to be in unison with the industry concerned). The food security regulation 
in place in the USA as developed after 9/11 is a good example. This role is also 
played in providing an economic order that meets the political requirements. 
Competition laws and regulations aim at limiting companies from pursuing their 
private goals if this would go at the expense of consumers. In the same spirit, the 
government may establish regulation to secure that companies that become 
excessively influential as to standards, or flows and nature of food products, comply 
with outside monitoring or control, or else scale down.  
 
Finally, the government has a role in developing the framework for the society to face 
the challenges of disaster risk reduction and enter into discussions on these risks and 
how these are covered in the present food system and its institutional environment.  
 
To this end, the Hyogo framework for action stipulates that the governments secure: 
? political commitment 
? legal and regulatory framework 
? institutional framework 
? multi-stakeholder participation 
? capacities for disaster reduction 
? financial resources 
 
This Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted in 2005 at a conference in Kobe, 
Hyogo district, Japan and signed by 145 countries as an outcome of the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) by the United Nations. It distinguishes five 
priorities:  
1. Making disaster risk reduction a priority. 
2. Improving risk information and early warning. 
3. Building a culture of safety and resilience. 
4. Reducing the risks in key sectors. 
5. Strengthening preparedness for response 
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As part of the framework, countries adopted National Platforms, that are occasionally 
based in civil society groups, but often linked to the government. Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK are among the countries that set up such National Platforms in 
Europe. The Netherlands appears not to have such platform.  
 
Some aspects stressed above reappear among the five priorities: next to the political 
commitment, resilience features in priority 3, and the key sectors (including ‘system 
companies’) in priority 4. The instrument of Platforms, and the governmental 
responsibility for multi-stakeholder participation show the emphasis on the interactive 
approach to the issue. Whilst individual companies may internally adhere to rules that 
limit their exposures to risks, they may be unaware of what their suppliers, 
competitors and clients do, and how their economic and social context prepares. 
Individual activities to mitigate risks are ineffective if they are not attuned to their 
economic and social environment. To do so requires involvement of all stakeholders 
and transparency of individually adopted procedures. Only the government can 
enforce such a process. 
 
While OECD governments are certainly able to play this role, the adoption of the 
Hyogo framework is not universal in this group. There is a diversity of approaches, 
with the USA focusing more than other countries on security against terrorist attacks 
and – in the food sector – bio-terrorism. Outside the OECD, governments may not all 
be strong enough and countries may not be resourceful enough to adopt an approach 
involving all stakeholders. The poorer the country, the less scope there is for success-
ful implementation of risk reduction measures.   
 
 11
5. The role of the private sector 
 
The emphasis on the government’s role in bringing the various parties of the private 
sector, civil society and NGOs together is a token of the private sector’s apparent 
inability to do so by themselves. Yet, many companies have made efforts in this 
direction, also including entering into public debates with the non-commercial 
stakeholders. The largest companies are often at the forefront of this development, 
thus showing a sense of responsibility befitting their size. 
 
There are two lines of reasoning pertinent to risk management in the private sector. 
One is the concept of Business Continuity Management (BCM), which focuses on 
measures to make companies continue their operations, being more resilient even in 
times of trouble. The second is the capacity of companies to secure their processes 
against intrusion. This is an issue that dominates in the USA. The implementation of 
new procedures has led to adoption of more uniform processes, so as to better and 
more securely monitor these. This has brought cost savings too.  
Helen Peck (2005) has evaluated the resilience aspect for the sectors in the UK. She 
concludes that Business Continuity Management was still in its early stages of 
implementation. Few of the companies had moved beyond reactive crisis management 
to proactive or preventive BCM. The report includes the results of a survey among the 
business of their actions in relation to potential disasters such as fuel shortages, 
pandemic diseases, etc. The lack of spare capacity is seen as a problem by the author: 
the very efficiency of the sector makes it vulnerable. And she concludes that “for the 
moment it is unrealistic to assume that BCM would ensure the continuity of food and 
drinks supplies in the event of a national emergency”. More government planning to 
that effect is proposed. 
In a related report (DEFRA, 2006) on food security the Food Chain Analysis Group 
warns against national self-sufficiency, and puts this in a wider EU setting. The 
flexibility of the supply chains, as evidenced by recent experiences, was praised and 
as modern risks are heterogeneous and uncertain, strengthening this flexibility is the 
way forward. This reflects the point of view of the link between innovation and 
flexibility mentioned above in section 1 and ascribed to Fritz & Schiefer (2008).  
Studies on the adjustments in the USA indicate that the implementation of business 
continuity and security plans in the industry also led to considerable cost reduction 
because of the simplifications and standardizations that resulted from the effort to 
make the process less vulnerable. The literature on the US grain industry (Kenneth et 
al., Wilson et al.) suggests that the increase in processing of food makes the food 
system more industrialized and hence more demanding in terms of specific qualities 
that are required to optimize the process. Such optimization may lead to vertical 
integration in the supply chain to secure the supply of the required quality. This then 
detracts from the scale economies that were realized before at a horizontal level. 
  
The private sector prepares itself for disruptions in the spirit of what Peck calls 
‘enlightened commercial self-interest’. Large retailers often have to deal with 
disruptions here and there, but are sufficiently diversified to deal with it. Food 
processors often are less diversified, and this also held for some UK port facilities that 
appear to specialize. The UK firms in Peck’s analysis appear to have given at least 
 12
some thought to disruptions caused by fuel shortage, electricity shortage, manpower 
shortage and the like. 
 
A particular private sector role is for the insurance sector. Over time, many new 
insurance instruments have been developed that offer some form of insurance for the 
financial damage of disasters, including bonds and options tied to catastrophic risks 
(Courbage, 2001; World Economic Forum, 2008: p. 32). Successful approaches are 
insurances for financial damage from earthquakes, as in Turkey or Taiwan (Smolka, 
2005). They appear to require a compulsory premium payment however. Other 
possibilities are the insurance of costs related to food aid or insurance of states for the 
immediate costs after a disaster (Ghesquiere and Mahul, 2007).   
While in principle insurance premiums can act as incentives to mitigate risks, this 
requires the premiums to be conditional on the measures taken. Often this goes 
beyond the capacity of the insurers regarding enforceability and a reliable calculation 
of actuarially fair premiums. In addition, while immediate individual financial risks 
could be covered, the damage itself is not, nor its effects on third parties, future 
developments etc. 
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6. The role of research 
 
The implementation of disaster risk reduction requires more knowledge about the 
possible effects of disasters, their values and their probabilities. It also requires novel 
research on the social aspects of the stakeholder participation in the process, and the 
psychological factors that come with assessment of extreme events with low 
probabilities but large damage. The International Council for Science (ICSU, 2008) 
has formulated a science plan for integrated research on disaster risk. It includes 
research to characterize hazards, to understand decision-making in the complex and 
changing risk contexts and to reduce the risk and curb losses and vulnerability.  
Within the context of IPCC, of course, a tremendous amount of research in disasters 
related to climatic events is assembled. Of relevance for the governance of disasters 
will be the recent proposal to launch an IPCC review on managing risks of disasters. 
O’Brien et al. (2008) whose report led to the initiative, review the research on 
disasters and human security to conclude that the social dimensions of disasters are 
often overlooked, in the sense that humanitarian assistance focuses on restoring the 
normal conditions, without addressing the issue that these ‘normal’ conditions meant 
that households were vulnerable to the disaster in the first place. Resilience of the 
country’s economic, social and food system is therefore key to reducing disaster risks. 
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7. Current national arrangements concerning food provision 
 
Many countries have taken measures and elaborated plans to prepare their citizens for 
disasters. Most common disasters that are envisaged are earthquakes, flooding and 
droughts, to which 9/11 added terrorist attacks. The OECD (2003) distinguishes five 
systematic risks: natural disasters, industrial accidents, infectious diseases, terrorism 
and food safety.  The World Economic Forum (2008) gives no less than  four domains 
with 31 distinguished risks: 6 risks in economics (including volatile food prices in the 
food system); 12 risks in geo-politics (including more trade barriers); 7 risks as to 
environment (including droughts, flooding); 4 risk in society (including infectious 
diseases); and 2 in technology including disruption of critical information 
infrastructure. It is noteworthy that most of the risks pertaining to the food sector in 
this January 2008 list were not included in 2007 list of the same Forum. 
For all such risks, countries have prepared themselves in one way or the other.  
 
Countries facing regular droughts (e.g. Australia) have developed schemes to deal 
with drought as they strike, but have also moved from such coping regulation to more 
management oriented measures. These imply that farmers and other stakeholders are 
made more aware of what they can do to diminish the probability or severity of such 
droughts. Wright (2005) describes how drought changed from a ‘natural phenomenon’ 
before 1990 to an issue for which individual farmers could prepared themselves, with 
only access to government assistance in severe emergency cases. In addition, more 
support arose for actions to stimulate preventive actions, issuance of ‘water rights’ in 
rural areas, and water cuts in urban areas. Special actions are needed for young 
farmers, old farmers, non-farm rural businesses. Better forecasting approaches should 
be possible. It is a line of policy that is also advised by Wilhite (2005) for other 
regions, including the EU. Apart from Australia, and South Africa, and to some extent 
USA, countries have no drought plans, he asserts.  Motha (2005) describes how the 
USA has made the same transition as Australia in moving from a reactive behaviour 
(providing assistance post hoc) to a more proactive approach. The latter approach is 
more bottom-up as it requires the involvement of the local communities so as to be 
alert on first signs of damage, and oversee the use of good practices. Taking this 
proactive approach, evaluating the size of the risks that lie ahead, and pooling these 
risks offers opportunities for risk coverage through commercial (perhaps partly 
subsidized) insurance policies. 
 
Countries facing risk of flooding, such as the Netherlands, have prepared by 
providing protection that reduces the probability of flooding. The traditional norm 
maintained by the Netherlands as to the probability of flooding was 1 in 10,000 years 
for the sea dikes. The recent Deltacommissie (2008) proposed however to reduce this 
probability by a factor 10 in view of the uncertainties surrounding future rise in water 
levels, and the updated (much higher) estimates of the damage that flooding would 
cause. Responsibility for the proposed measures falls, however, almost exclusively on 
the government, though regulation is in place requiring farmers to maintain 
unobstructed waterways etc. To cope with calamities such as flooding, an institutional 
setting is established that also provides training and realistic exercises to test the 
preparedness (Ministerie LNV, 2008). Crucial element proved to be the 
communication among the many stakeholders and decision making levels involved.  
In Europe, as Vetere Arellano(2007) shows, many institutional arrangements are in 
place to deal with inland flood risks in and around river basins. The authors sketch the 
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same shift of approach as for droughts: from reactive to proactive, with the underlying 
implication that floods are no longer seen as natural hazards (acts of God) but rather 
the result of failing, or at least insufficient management. The proactive approach can 
only be successful if the stakeholders are (made) sufficiently aware of the 
consequences of their behaviour and the links between policy measures and 
behaviour. Communication, as so often, is key. 
 
As to food risks, developed countries have focused on food safety and food security, 
in the American sense of the word, which refers to safeguards against bioterrorism. A 
good example of the measures considered is given in the recent reports made for the 
UK and referred to above under ‘the role of the private sector’. The reports, and the 
UK cabinet’s view is to see the food provision in a international context, with an 
emphasis on Europe. Self-sufficiency is not an attractive option, they assert. Much of 
the actual monitoring is left to the private sector, which is required to follow the 
HACCP protocol. Government’s role is to see to it that they do, and take action if they 
do not. The private sector has occasionally set even higher standards for suppliers in 
the chain than the official standards. Yet, the survey among the private sector in the 
UK found that insufficient spare capacity is maintained and that the system would not 
be able to withstand a major shock. 
In the USA, even more emphasis appears to be put on abiding by strict rules as to 
monitoring of goods, flows and the people that can possibly interfere with these 
goods. Again, the governance aspect of it is that the government sets the regulations, 
checks, and corrects where needed, but the companies determine the actual 
arrangements made in accordance with their exposure, environment etc. Examples are 
in USDA (2005a,b).  
There appears to be no use of strategic stocks in countries such as the UK or the EU, 
while the USA abolished the reserve in 1996. A specific supply strategy is developed 
in Switzerland, where the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs has a 
National Economic Supply Strategy, that includes compulsory stocking of essential 
food items for a consumption of 6 months, as well as energy and pharmaceutical 
items. Plans are developed in close collaboration with the industry. Among the 
developing countries, India maintains a large national grain reserve as a result of its 
interventions in the market. 
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8 Initiatives by the European Union 
The European Union was already mentioned above as a locus for policy initiatives as 
to flood risks. It deploys also activities in other fields of risk. This ranges from 
standards for risk assessment in companies, to regulation of risk taking by financial 
firms, and the regulations as to health risks by the European Food Safety Organization 
EFSO.  
As to uncertainties about the quality of food, EFSO published Euro-barometer (2003) 
findings that  show that no single source of food risks is dominant. Most mentioned 
answer to the question of “what comes to mind when thinking about problems or risks 
associated with food” is food poisoning (16% of respondents), followed by toxic 
substances in food (14%) and overweight (13%). GMOs score 8%, food additives 7%.  
It is noteworthy that the fear for some adulteration or interference with the food 
outside the household features prominently. This supports the call for emphasis on the 
reliability of the food system to secure healthy food. 
As to the wider issue of disaster prevention, on 23 February 2009, the European 
Commission (EC) put forward two Communications related to disasters: On the 
prevention of natural and man-made disasters within the EU; and an EU Strategy for 
supporting disaster risk reduction (DRR) in developing countries. The first 
communication is rather tacit on any measures, and strives mostly toward integration 
and coordination of national measures, something which is also aimed at by the 
meetings of the Hyogo National Platforms where these exist. The second 
communication relates the EU assistance for developing countries to the same Hyogo 
framework and aims at contributing to disaster risk reduction in the supported 
countries. 
Boin et al. (2006) investigate the capacities of the EU to actually deploy useful 
activities in relation to disasters. Their work looks at the roles that the EU 
functionaries can play in four phases around crises: prevention, preparation, coping 
and aftermath. Their conclusion is the EU capabilities at the various directorates 
coincide with their experiences and involvements with earlier crises. In general there 
is alertness and possibility for quick decision making. Planning seems to be foot-loose 
in that it does hardly involve the member states, while coping activities are difficult 
again due to the interaction with the members states involved. The willingness to 
learn was there. 
The research shows that finding the appropriate level of response to a crisis is an art 
by itself. While all events must naturally be dealt with at the lowest level, higher 
levels had better not interfere as long as lower levels can cope.  
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9. International arrangements  
The same adage applies to international arrangements. There are economies of scale 
in the prevention stage, an area where the EU also scored well in Boin’s et al. 
research. Such economies of scale are exploited by organizations as the FAO, with a 
global coverage of food trade and food risks. Their GIEWS division on Global 
Information and Early Warning System monitors food production globally, which  for 
an integrated world is useful. FAO also houses, where needed, crisis management 
centres, as for example established for the avian influenza. It is, in this sense, 
providing part of the institutional framework that is required to deal with international 
crisis situations. This does not extend to legal and regulatory work, as this is up to the 
member countries. Its expertise is helpful for preventing crises, and advising on 
coping with crises when these emerge, and surely for the evaluation and accumulation 
of expertise. 
As to grain trade, the FAO together with the International Grains Council, serves the 
International Grains Agreement, which helps to keep up transparency in case of food 
aid and grain shipments. For a crucial food (and feed) ingredient like grains, close 
monitoring of shipments, stocks and prices is welcome, and that is what IGC and the 
FAO do. As food aid may interfere with grains trade, this is also made more 
transparent by the Food Aid Convention, also served by the IGC. The latter 
convention also regulates that the major exporting regions make some amounts of 
grain or cash available for food aid when so demanded. The Food aid Convention is 
under discussion (Hoddinott and Cohen, 2007) as to its goals and representation. The 
present goal is not much beyond some pledges for grains or cash, and it might be 
opportune to extend this to wider ranges of goods, a wider food security objective and 
better representation in the council. The Grains Agreement had already been extended 
to cover not just grains but also rice and oilseeds. 
While there are international arrangements for trade policies, and protocols and 
constraints regarding their changes, the recent financial crisis shows a lack of 
internationally agreed supervision on risks taken by individual companies. As the 
World Economic Forum (2008) writes ‘Extended supply chains, which have allowed 
global economic integration to flourish in the last two decades, may be concealing 
increased vulnerability of the global system to disruptive risks’ and it concludes to ‘a 
need for governance of globalization’ (p.6).  
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10. Conclusions and recommendations  
This review of the governance regarding food calamities indicates that a shift is being 
made from a reactive approach to calamities to a proactive approach. The reactive 
approach is to come into operation when the calamity has occurred and naturally 
therefore, the governance of it relates to an effective way of providing the required 
assistance, with possible extensions towards later reconstruction, and lessons learned 
for the next time. The proactive approach sees calamities as intrinsically unavoidable, 
but with good possibilities for mitigation. Starting from the expectation that calamities 
will occur, the stakeholders can prepare themselves for it, perhaps assess its 
probability, and possible damage. This gives scope for ex ante measures aiming at 
improving the resilience of the (food) system, and preparing stakeholders on what to 
do in case the calamity occurs. For some disasters, it becomes possible to insure the 
finance that is expected to be needed when calamity strikes.  
Risks envisaged in the food chain require governance with respect to the chain’s 
resilience and regarding preparation for coping. Resilience of the system in Europe is 
considerable, but a renewed balance must be found between responsibilities of 
government and the major trading, processing and servicing companies in the field. 
Much of the governance in the EU is done in a European setting, following EU 
guidelines as to transparency, risk monitoring etc. This is the adequate level for 
building on resilience. Trust in food products and securing reliable links in the supply 
chain is a European if not global responsibility. More analysis should be made of the 
division of responsibilities between private sector, members states and the European 
Commission. It would require focus on ‘system companies’, and important points of 
constriction (often included under ‘strategic infrastructure’), and limiting too wide a 
spread of specific ingredients. Resilience is helped by diversity, not by scale.  
With respect to the primary producers, their exposure to climatic conditions causes 
highly covariant risks that affect the industry (and rather distantly consumers). In this 
domain too, a proactive approach is to develop more resilience against drought and 
floods in the agricultural sector. Only little evidence was found for such proactive 
activities in Europe. 
When it comes to coping strategies, the level at which this is handled is different. The 
experiences with disasters were much more at the national levels, with national 
authorities setting the stage, even when acting as executors of EU regulation. The help 
services and information flows tend to have national channels, rather than EU 
channels. While preventive measures can be designed at the EU level, coping 
strategies must be worked out and practiced at the local, national levels.  
The international arena recognizes this importance of involving local stakeholders in 
preparing for disasters. Its Hyogo Framework for Action includes many steps geared 
toward such involvement and the collection of relevant research output to support 
decision making. National Platforms are established in many countries to help foster 
this process. It is surprising that such a Platform does not seem to exist in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Within the private sector there is some evidence of limited capacity for dealing with 
shocks, due to limited storage and spare capacity. While understandable, this may 
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prove costly when calamities strike. Fiscal and other measures can be considered to 
promote stronger robustness of the food industry. 
 
The European industry might benefit from an overhaul of its operations with a view to 
business continuity management. The examples of the USA and elsewhere show that 
further reduction of the potential for disaster can be achieved by harmonizing 
processes, ingredients and sourcing routes and this is also a cost-effective exercise.  
 
At the international level there should be an institution providing governance of the 
international transactions in the food chain. The WTO is a forum for establishing rules 
against trade limiting actions, but its powers do not include regulations for the multi-
national companies, or the desirability of limits on transmission of shocks from one 
region to the other, or standards for transparency and accountability of firms that 
determine the resilience of the whole food system. A global institution for governance 
of globalization is needed indeed. 
 
The institutional arrangements and governance of the food system have worked well. 
But they may not assure sufficient resilience of the very system in the face of further 
globalization and growth of oligopolistic structures. This would require global 
governance and corresponding institutions..  
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Appendix: Terms of Reference 
 
The terms of reference for this inventory study are  
 
Inventory 3: Long-term strategic governance of the resilience of the world food 
system   
1. Review of literature, in which a distinction is made in  
a. disaster preparedness 
b. disaster coping 
c. disaster avoidance (such as by social cohesion to avoid conflicts, 
policies to avoid flooding landslides, climate change etc.) 
d. planning under uncertainty as to disasters 
2. Review of measures and action already taken, both internationally and 
nationally; and in particular an overview of risk-management and risk-
coping measures with their financial and non-financial costs and benefits 
3. Review of private sector measures and actions and elicitation of scope for 
public-private partnerships  
The output is a report on the findings and the views gained in this inventory study, 
including a strategy on how to elaborate the issue further in a subsequent study with a 
view to practical policy advice. The main attention will be given to the identification 
of strategies, which can contribute to avoidance of and coping with potential food 
calamities. 
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